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It is often ignored that public opinion polls cost money. Someone, some institution or 
organization needs to be prepared to carry the costs associated with the process of opin-
ion surveying. In 1939, an employee of the recently founded Institut Français d’Opinion 
Publique in Paris estimated the costs of a normal representative survey to be around 
25,000 Franc, which amounts to the equivalent of roughly € 7,500 in today’s money in 
terms of purchasing power.1 What then were the interests of those who ultimately had 
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to fund these surveys? The answer to this question allows the historian to make sense of 
the explosive growth of opinion polling in the period between 1930 and 1950: it is only 
through the analysis of commercial and media dynamics that we can explain the rapid 
diffusion of this new knowledge technique in this period. This paper employs the catego-
ries of ‘attention’ and ‘trust’ to describe opinion polling as a communicative practice. It 
takes its cue from Georg Franck’s notion of an ‘economy of attention’: in a culture char-
acterized by an over-supply of information, the real challenge for any participant in the 
market-place – regardless of whether he wants to sell goods, ideas, news, or ideology – is 
to entice contemporaries to invest their precious time into one’s own offerings, thereby 
crowding out those of one’s competitors.2 But Franck spends little time on the question 
of how this attention, once gained, can be sustained. Recent scholarship has highlighted 
the importance of trust as a significant form of social capital which underpins relation-
ships, not least that between audiences and experts.3 This paper then tries to trace how 
mid-twentieth-century contemporaries learned of public opinion polling, and how they 
came to accept and trust this new representation of public opinion. In doing so, it will 
look at three interrelated aspects: public opinion polling’s foundation myth in the mid-
1930s; the internationalization of polling in the subsequent decade; and the effects of 
market dynamics on the practice of opinion pollsters. It thus hopes to attract attention 
to the crucial transnational dimension of public opinion polling which has been largely 
ignored by existing studies of the history of opinion polling. Yet the rise of opinion pol-
ling is not only a common characteristic of democracies in the course of the twentieth 
century. It is also a genuinely international development, based on an exchange of ideas, 
practices and personnel across borders, and influenced by the observation of events and 
advances in other countries.
1. Foundation Myth
Let us begin with the foundation myth reproduced in almost every single history of 
political opinion polling: the breakthrough of representative opinion surveys based on 
statistical probability models on the occasion of the American presidential elections of 
1936.4 This breakthrough was associated with a particular name, to which the American 
mass media soon added a face: Dr. George Gallup.5 He benefited from a particularly 
American media tradition of attention production, namely the ‘straw poll’. Gallup is of 
central importance for the internationalization of political opinion surveying, and it is 
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‘breakthrough’, and which attracted attention to both the ‘new’ opinion measurement 
technique and to Gallup.  
Already in the nineteenth century, newspapers and journals reported on a variety of lo-
cal or regional straw polls, especially in the context of presidential elections; in the late 
nineteenth century the media itself began initiating such polls.6 Not only did such polls 
generate attention among consumers, they also resulted in some early assumptions about 
the political effects of such attention production. Commenting on the changes in popu-
larity ratings among the various Republican candidates in the run-up to the presidential 
elections of 1908, the Washington Post thought that a considerable number of people 
polled in recent straw polls ‘are simply climbing on the band wagon, and put themselves 
in the column of the candidate known to be in the lead.’7 In the early 1920s, the concept 
of such a ‘bandwagon’ effect had already gained such currency that it was used by politi-
cians as a rhetorical device in their rebuttal of displeasing straw polls and in their engage-
ment with political opponents. In the final weeks before the presidential elections of 
1924, for example, a leading Democratic spokesman denounced the results of a particu-
lar straw poll as being part of a Republican campaign ‘to deceive the public into believing 
that President Coolidge is a sure winner and thus capture the “bandwagon” vote.’8 
It is no coincidence that this criticism was directed at a straw poll conducted by the 
weekly magazine Literary Digest. This magazine had been among the first to recognize 
the commercial potential of such polls and was the first publication to have a stab at 
conducting a ‘national’ straw poll, in the run-up to the presidential election of 1916.9 
From 1920 onwards the Literary Digest’s straw polls assumed ever more spectacular 
dimensions. These polls served to attract further attention to the magazine within the 
highly competitive American media market, with the intention of gaining more sub-
scribers, and thus ultimately to increase subscription and advertisement income.10 As an 
advertising strategy, the straw polls worked wonders. For a short while during the 1920s, 
the Digest boasted the highest circulation of any American current affairs weekly, with 
1.5 million readers in 1925.11 In the run-up to the presidential election of 1932, the 
Digest made use of its own subscribers’ address list, as well as telephone and car-owner 
directories, and sent out more than twenty million straw ballots.12 During the six weeks 
before the elections in early November 1932, continuous updates on the incoming re-
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coverage.13 And when the election results were announced, it transpired that the Digest’s 
straw poll had been uncannily accurate in its prediction, missing Roosevelt’s eventual 
share of the popular vote by only 0.4 per cent.14 It was the fourth accurate prediction of 
a presidential election in a row, a fact not lost on contemporaries. Some papers suggested 
calling off the elections and using the Digest instead; frustrated Republicans saw it as 
clear evidence of bandwagon voting and called for a ban on straw polls.15 Its track record 
allowed the Literary Digest to adopt the marketing slogan ‘sounding board of American 
opinion’ to capture advertising clients’ attention.16 At this point in time, the Digest’s 
straw polls were an established brand, based primarily on their reputation for size and 
historical accuracy.
Like any other commercially successful operation the success of the Literary Digest at-
tracted imitators. Clearly, the production of quantitative surveys of individual views 
constituted a sellable product. That was not just true for the observation of consumer 
preferences. Its findings, as American market researchers had successfully demonstrated 
for some decades, could be sold as exclusive, arcane knowledge to consumer industries, 
which used them as a strategic steering device in turn. The Digest straw polls allowed 
contemporaries to appreciate that within the competitive American media market sur-
vey results of citizens’ opinions had a news value and thereby a commercial value, too. 
The challenge, now, was to offer the same service as the Literary Digest poll, but more 
cheaply by way of a different methodological procedure, which would make it possible 
to increase the frequency of surveys, and thereby offer a product which conformed better 
to the media logic of political news reporting. It was no coincidence that those players 
entering the media market in 1935 with surveys based on representative quota samples 
were all and without exception established market researchers. They were able to offer 
their expertise in quota sampling, and at the same time were trusted by publishers as 
market research experts because their method had already been demonstrated to work 
in the area of commercial attention measurement.17 At the same time, they were able to 
keep down costs of market entry by making use of their existing cohort of interviewers, 
and could benefit from future synergies.18 
Although there were a number of opinion survey companies which used such a novel 
purposive design quota-sampling method from 1935 onwards, as far as the wider public 
was concerned it was a method associated primarily with George Gallup after 1936. 
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Why? Because he knew best how to make use of the Literary Digest’s reputation, and 
how to exploit the focus of attention during a presidential election, by seeking a high-
profile confrontation with the market leader. At this point, the concept of ‘brand recog-
nition’ was already widely established within American market research, and negative ad-
vertising too was being studied by marketing experts.19 Gallup was one of them: in 1928, 
he had completed his PhD dissertation, ‘An Objective Method for Determining Reader 
Interest in the Content of a Newspaper’; in 1932, he became vice-president and direc-
tor of research for the advertising firm Young and Rubicam in New York, and taught at 
Columbia’s School of Journalism from 1933.20 He was therefore well aware of the news 
value of conflict within the media market, and he positioned his product accordingly. 
Already four months prior to the presidential election of 1936, Gallup pronounced in 
one of his syndicated newspaper columns that the Literary Digest poll was known for its 
size and historical accuracy: but this time, with the election a close race, polling meth-
odology would play a crucial role, and in this respect the Digest poll would suffer from 
an over-representation of the more affluent groups of society. Were the Digest poll held 
right now, Gallup claimed, its results would show a significant lead for the Republican 
candidate, Alf Landon (56 per cent to Roosevelt’s 44 per cent), whereas Gallup’s own 
polling organization showed that Roosevelt was marginally ahead in voters’ preferenc-
es.21 The conflict thus created between newcomer and established market leader became 
a prominent feature of campaign news coverage in 1936, and arguably one of the most 
successful advertisement campaigns in the twentieth century. It was not the first time for 
the methodological approach of the Literary Digest poll to come under scrutiny – but 
this time there was a plausible alternative on offer with Gallup’s American Institute of 
Public Opinion, which presented itself consistently as ‘scientific’ and novel in approach. 
The Washington Post and Gallup produced further attention by launching a competi-
tion which called on participants to predict the election outcome themselves, and to 
describe shortly the method or material used for their prediction.22 The conflict over the 
‘right’ polling method attracted a lot of media attention, not least because throughout 
the campaign period the Literary Digest and Gallup’s AIPO consistently disagreed on 
which of the two candidates was in the lead. Hence media commentators could present 
the election results not just as the decision in a political race, but also as one between 
two media ‘rivals’.23 
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Thus Roosevelt’s landslide victory of 1936 also signified the victory of George Gallup and 
the ‘new’ method of ‘scientific polling’.24 Even those media which had so far refrained 
from covering the polling results of Gallup’s AIPO now had to make references to its 
accurate election prediction when reporting on the spectacular failure of the Literary Di-
gest poll. Gallup now became the subject of multiple press features, and gained a highly 
prestigious new subscriber to his syndicated columns with the New York Times which 
added significant symbolic capital to his name.25 Market researchers were delighted with 
the attention Gallup thus produced for their quantitative method, and apparently reg-
istered a strong increase in customer interest within a few days of the election.26 In the 
following months and years Gallup used the newly-won public attention to popularize 
his name and his institute’s polling method. He undertook public speaking engagements 
and wrote numerous popular and scholarly articles on the representative sample survey 
of public opinion, in which the dramatic breakthrough story and the Literary Digest 
failure of 1936 featured prominently.27 
2. Internationalization
One of the many fascinated consumers of this dramatic narrative was Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann, a German exchange student who spent a year at the School of Journalism in 
Columbia, Missouri, in the academic year 1937/38. As a consequence, she abandoned 
her earlier Ph.D. research topic, and upon her return to Nazi Germany wrote a disserta-
tion entitled ‘American Mass Surveys in Politics and the Press’.28 She went on to become 
the Grand Old Dame of public opinion polling in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
in her memoirs (published in 2006) she devoted a lengthy section to re-narrating the 
foundational story of Gallup’s breakthrough.29 At an international conference in 1955, 
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ter gives us a glimpse of the attention which Gallup was able to enjoy at this moment 
in time. It is reproduced in Noelle-Neumann’s memoirs, and thus constitutes a visual 
marker which directs the attention of the reader towards Noelle-Neumann’s connection 
to the foundation myth of her discipline. The caption describes Gallup as ‘the founder 
of the method of representative surveys’. In this, Noelle-Neumann followed the media 
tenor of US journalists of the late 1930s, and the tradition of commercial pollsters to 
the present day. 
Gallup caught the attention not only of young exchange student Elisabeth Noelle. In 
Britain, too, media makers encountered the story of the 1936 election – not least because 
most foreign correspondents were used to reading the Washington Post, and therefore 
Gallup’s columns.30 The world’s second-largest media market was an obvious area for 
expansion for Gallup, and already in 1936 one of his employees recruited assistants for 
a team in London with whom Gallup founded the British Institute of Public Opinion 
(BIPO) in 1937. For Gallup, the British subsidiary had several advantages: first of all, 
international expansion demonstrated market acceptance of his method and thereby 
strengthened trust in Gallup as a brand. Furthermore, British opinions on foreign policy 
topics were a marketable commodity in the US too, not least because of Hitler’s aggres-
sive expansionism. In fact, it was only after the Sudeten Crisis of September 1938 that 
the British Gallup branch entered public consciousness, because it was only now that 
the leading liberal newspaper, the News Chronicle, signed a contract with BIPO and 
started publishing the results of opinion surveys which it commissioned. The newspaper 
was a harsh critic of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy; it was therefore no coincidence 
that the first published opinion survey – a few weeks after the dramatic days of Munich 
– measured the popularity of Chamberlain and public trust in the sustainability of the 
peace allegedly saved by him.31 In public statements, the newspaper’s editor emphasized 
the fact that the brand ‘Gallup’ guaranteed the reliability of the survey results. As he 
wrote in a letter-to-the-editors at The Times: ‘the British and American Institutes being, 
in effect, two branches of one body, both under the direct control of Dr. George Gallup, 
their founder’.32 
In France, too, the ‘brand’ Gallup caught contemporaries’ attention, and played a deci-
sive role in the early establishment of political opinion polling, as shown by Loïc Blon-
diaux.33 The French journalist Alfred Max and the sociologist Jean Stoetzel met Gallup 
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in their foundation of the Institut Français d’Opinion Publique (IFOP) the follow-
ing year, in 1939.34 The similarity in name with the American original and its British 
subsidiary was no coincidence, but economic necessity: not the survey method as such 
convinced the first client, but Gallup’s reputation. During a trip to Europe in 1939, 
Gallup personally helped IFOP gain a contract with the Paris Soir, the newspaper with 
the highest circulation of any daily in France, which in design and journalistic practice 
followed the lead of American and British press products.35 In July 1939, the first pub-
lished French opinion survey, which drew on the results of the three organizations and 
which quantified (among other things) the popularity of various statesmen including 
Hitler and Mussolini, was announced on the front-page of Paris Soir as the first ‘Gallup 
referendum’ in France – and naturally the newspaper also pointed to Gallup’s success in 
1936 in accurately measuring American public sentiment.36 
During his trip to Europe in 1939 Gallup was also in Berlin, where he was hoping 
to establish a German Institute – a plan apparently abandoned after the German at-
tack on Poland.37 He was more successful in Denmark where he made contact with the 
Danish advertising professional, Haagen Wahl Asmussen, who went on to organize the 
Dansk Gallup Institut in 1939, and the Svenska Gallup Institutet (in Sweden) in Oc-
tober 1941.38 The year 1941 also saw the foundation of the Australian Public Opinion 
Polls and of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, and one year later a Brazilian 
polling organization followed (1942: Instituto Brasileiro de Opiniao Publica e Estatis-
tica, affiliated in 1946).39 Shortly after the end of the Second World War institutes were 
established in the Netherlands (Nederlandsch Institut voor de Publieke Opinie, founded 
in 1945, affiliated in February 1947), Finland (1945: Suomen Gallup Oy), and Norway 
(1945: Norsk Gallup Institutt).40 In May 1947, representatives of the various Gallup 
institutes met for a first international conference in Loxwood Hall, Sussex, and founded 
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from eleven countries.41 A few months later, the World Congress for Public Opinion Re-
search (later to become the World Association of Public Opinion Research, or WAPOR) 
was voted into existence during the founding conference of the American Association 
for Public Opinion Research in Williamstown, Massachusetts, during a session chaired 
by Gallup.42 Throughout the rest of the 1940s and 1950s, representatives of the various 
Gallup organizations were regularly voted into leading positions of WAPOR. 
3. Market dynamics
The establishment of these early Gallup institutes in their various markets always fol-
lowed the same pattern: market researchers used their methodology of representative 
quota sampling to produce survey results with news value, and media enterprises hoped 
to attract reader attention by offering these news.43 The News Chronicle in Britain was 
not the only media enterprise beginning to take an interest in the new product when re-
alizing that it could produce new and additional attention for a particular political topic 
(in this case Appeasement), in which the publishing company had already invested sig-
nificantly employing other journalistic techniques; the same was true in the case of Can-
ada and Australia.44 But it was election surveys which offered by far the greatest attention 
value and were consequently given the greatest media exposure, not least because of the 
media logic of ‘horse-race reporting’ in the run up to any election, and because of the 
implicit verification of the trustworthiness of opinion surveys through each election.45 
This hierarchical order of attention (or news) values for a range of different societal issues 
also determined the definition of the surveyed population, the statistical ‘universe’ for 
which quota samples were constructed. The collective of individuals surveyed by Gallup 
organizations in the 1930s and 1940s was that of voters, a ‘miniature electorate’ as Gal-
lup put it himself in his book The Pulse of Democracy in 1940.46 In fact, it was not even 
the collective of eligible voters in any given country but more narrowly that of actual 
voters (as defined by statistical analyses of past elections) or – more problematic still – the 
group of individuals considered most likely to vote in the next election. This constructed 
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The media and economic logic which underpinned the definition of the surveyed ‘uni-
verse’ also explains the existence of Gallup’s ‘blind spots’, of societal groups either com-
pletely ignored or crudely under-represented: black Americans (who were not eligible 
to vote in the south of the US), Native Americans in the US or Canada, Aborigines in 
Australia, young people under the age of 21, individuals at the bottom of the economic 
ladder (the so-called ‘C2DE’ groups of market research), women, or foreigners.48 The 
implicit cultural assumptions and the economic and political power structures underly-
ing the statistical construction of the observed ‘universe’ were seldom made as explicit 
as in the announcement by Gallup to an expert public in autumn 1946 that his organi-
zation had just gained a new affiliate, in Brazil: ‘For the present the Brazilian Institute 
confines its opinion polling to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, those cities comprising a 
large proportion of the literate and politically articulate population of Brazil. The In-
stitute plans gradually to extend its polling operations to other parts of the country. 
Approximately 30,000,000 of Brazil’s 45,000,000 population belong to rural sections 
subject to the lowest standards of life in the world. Most of them are illiterate. Because 
of this special situation, it appears that the proposed cross-section is a reasonably sound 
cross-section of the voting population.’49 
Put differently: pollsters’ decision – taken at the outset of the surveying process – not to 
consider certain population groups as (politically) significant variables in the measure-
ment of opinion meant that these groups were not made ‘visible’, and that their poten-
tially specific political views were not given a voice. In the process of surveying mass 
attention to create a product for a predominantly white mass media public, a significant 
part of society was simply statistically ‘swallowed’ and thereby silenced.50 It is no coin-
cidence that the Civil Rights movement in the US only became visible to a mass media 
public through planned protest movements from the late 1950s onwards: in terms of 
public opinion surveys the movement had no history.51 This is not to suggest that com-
mercial opinion pollsters used these blind spots to suit a specific political agenda. Quite 
on the contrary, in view of their dependence on the mass media for the communication 
of their results, and the contemporary belief in strong media effects, as well as public 
sensitivity to propaganda (heightened by the perception of media and propaganda abuse 
by the Nazis), pollsters avoided anything that could strengthen the position of those crit-
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trust in opinion polling built up after 1936 was not to be put at risk carelessly by be-
ing seen to promote particularist interests, or interest groups. Tellingly, trust in opinion 
polling was measured very pragmatically in terms of numbers of (media) customers for 
pollsters’ products, and not by surveying the population’s views on opinion polling.
It would be wrong to assume that early practitioners of opinion polling were blissfully 
ignorant of methodological problems associated with the practice of surveying public 
opinion – but they were mostly concerned with problems for which there was a quick-
fix solution. Again and again, they pointed out that tendential or confusing questions 
which could seriously affect the results of any survey could be weeded out by thorough 
(‘scientific’) pre-testing of questionnaires, and they reminded the wider public and each 
other of their own position as ‘non-partisan’ observers who could be trusted to devise 
a battery of value-free questions for interviewers.53 Indeed, pre-testing questionnaires 
became an important ritual within polling practice.54 However, findings by academic 
survey researchers which showed that differences in social background between inter-
viewer and interviewee had a strong impact on the kind of answers received were sig-
nificantly more difficult to integrate into a low-cost production of survey results, and 
were therefore largely ignored by practitioners.55 Similarly, the method of representative 
quota sampling quickly came under fire from statisticians who pointed out that random 
sampling would yield significantly more representative results. But early experiments by 
commercial polling organisations showed that there were considerable practical prob-
lems in the implementation of random sampling; quota sampling also had the added ad-
vantage of being significantly cheaper.56 While issues such as question wording, question 
order, and sampling method were regularly discussed at conferences and within expert 
publications (like the Public Opinion Quarterly, founded in 1937), there was precious 
little engagement with the question of why certain topics or issues hardly ever featured 
on questionnaires, despite the almost ritualistic claims for the democratic potential of the 
new surveying technique: race relations, ethnic minorities, anti-Semitism, big business, 
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nature which clearly were not to the taste of mass media producers who were funding 
opinion surveys.57 Rather tellingly, the Association of Canadian Newspaper Publishers 
decided after lengthy deliberations not to commission the Canadian Institute of Public 
Opinion (CIPO) to conduct a survey on the public reputation of the Canadian press in 
the mid-1940s.58 
There is another significant blind spot of public opinion polling in this period: namely 
opinion polling itself. There was only one representative opinion survey which ques-
tioned Americans on their views on opinion polling in this period. This survey took place 
in the wake of the presidential election of 1944, in which Gallup’s AIPO had correctly 
predicted Roosevelt’s victory but for the third consecutive time had underforecast the 
number of Democratic voters. Democrats were incensed and suspected partisan tamper-
ing; in the New York Herald Tribune Walter Lippmann denounced what he called a ‘Gal-
lup Poll democracy’.59 Gallup was subsequently called to appear before an investigation 
committee in Congress to defend himself against accusations of manipulation.60 Shortly 
before Gallup’s appearance in the House, at the height of public criticism, colleagues at 
the Princeton Office of Public Opinion Research published a survey on public aware-
ness of polls, public confidence in the accuracy of polling results, and public trust in the 
honesty of pollsters.61 Asked whether they had ever heard of a public opinion poll, 56% 
of individuals surveyed answered ‘Yes’: but half of these respondents aware of the exis-
tence of opinion polls claimed not to pay any attention to published polling results and 
another third stated that they read them only ‘occasionally’. These findings did not deter 
pollsters from concluding by way of tendential questions that public trust in opinion 
surveys was in good health: ‘A majority of the American people know about the polls, 
believe them generally a good thing, and trust their reports. This is a striking vote of 
confidence for a social technique barely entering its second decade’, read the conclusion 
of the article reporting the finding of the survey in the scholarly journal Public Opinion 
Quarterly.62 Not surprisingly, this opinion had a news value for those mass media sub-
scribing to Gallup’s services, and therefore was relayed to a mass readership.63 
Interestingly, such a survey was not repeated in 1948, although it would have been very 
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topical, again due to an American presidential election. By now, as far as media com-
mentators were concerned Gallup was the personification of opinion polling. In May 
1948, his face graced the front cover of Time magazine, carrying the caption ‘For an 
election year, a political slide rule’; the feature described him as a ‘household name’.64 As 
the presenter of a weekly survey TV show broadcast by CBS, Gallup entered the living 
rooms of almost ten million television owners in the run-up to the election.65 In short, 
media attention lavished on Gallup at this point had reached a new quality. Gallup’s 
AIPO – like other commercial polling organizations – confidently predicted the victory 
of the Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. However, the winner was eventually Harry 
Truman. The photo of Truman, laughing and holding up a copy of the pro-Republi-
can Chicago Tribune which had already announced his defeat as front-page news on the 
morning after election night, has subsequently become one of the icons of American 
historical narratives of the twentieth century. In the context of this article it can be seen 
as a visualization of what Sarah Igo has called the persistent epistemological instability of 
political opinion polling.66
In view of Gallup’s media presence his ‘drop height’ in 1948 was considerable, and the 
media, political and scholarly attention devoted to the forecasting disaster was corre-
spondingly intense. The Social Science Research Council immediately established an 
investigation committee which concluded that there was no evidence of bad faith but 
‘much evidence of bad judgment’.67 Gallup and other commercial pollsters, the social 
science experts proclaimed, had been overly influenced by commercial concerns and 
had been obeying ‘journalistic rather than scientific demands’.68 However, the published 
report paid no attention to the question of the extent to which this polling debacle had 
diminished media consumers’ trust in the practice of public opinion polling. This does 
not mean that there was no scholarly interest in the consequences of the 1948 forecast-
ing disaster. In 1949, Paul Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research in New York 
organized a survey on this topic which, however, was not designed as a representative 
survey but as one which focussed on a particular, ‘strategic’ population group: namely 
that of American media producers.69 The definition of this survey’s universe was the re-
sult of the specific attention focus of the Lazarsfeld group which was primarily interested 
in the social and communicative process of political opinion formation in the wake of 
Lazarsfeld’s ‘discovery’ of the concepts of a ‘two-step flow of communication’ and the 
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method chosen: rather than using oral interviews, the social scientists mailed out ques-
tionnaires containing exclusively open questions. Open questions – i.e. questions that 
do not force respondents to choose between pre-determined answers (mostly Yes, No, 
or Don’t Know) – were then hardly ever used by commercial opinion pollsters because 
they were (and still are) considered ‘almost useless for statistical processing’, as one of 
the standard textbooks on opinion polling claimed.71 Indeed, the article which resulted 
from the survey conducted by the Bureau of Applied Social Research exemplified the fact 
that a qualitative analysis of surveyed opinions was difficult to represent in a concise and 
unambiguous – and thereby mass media-compatible – fashion. But one of the observa-
tions made by researchers in 1949 was highly significant, as well as paradoxical: many 
of those editors responding to the questionnaire explained their decision regarding the 
future of opinion polling in their papers – those who had decided to continue subscrib-
ing to polling organizations’ syndicated articles, as well as those who had cancelled their 
subscription – with reference to continuing – or vanishing – readers’ interest in opinion 
polls’ results.72 In other words, the raison d’être of public opinion polls as far as American 
editors were concerned was the existence of market demand for survey results.
In fact, the media market quickly forgave opinion pollsters their mishap of 1948, for a 
variety of reasons. Unlike in 1936, there was no obvious alternative on offer. Also, Gallup 
and other commercial pollsters seized the opportunity to present a technical quick-fix 
by changing slightly the method of surveying.73 More importantly still, subsequent elec-
tions saw a sequence of ‘accurate’ predictions which soon re-established trust in the reli-
ability of pollsters’ findings, and Gallup’s foreign associates played a crucial role in this. 
As Wilfrid Sanders, the head of the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion announced 
after the accurate forecast of the Canadian parliamentary election in 1949, their task had 
not simply been to get the right winner: ‘[W]e saw our task as that of demonstrating, 
out loud, that we had learned something from the Truman victory and the resultant 
post mortem, and that we were not simply going ahead with the same old tools, trusting 
that they would work better this time.’74 Finally, in those markets where opinion polling 
had already become an integral part of journalistic practice this particular serial form of 
societal self-description had created a demand which continued to require servicing.75 
One member of the public wrote to one of Gallup’s competitors in 1952: ‘I do not be-
lieve that you should – or that you can – withdraw from the field of published political 
research. The demand would still exist, and the gap you would leave would be filled by 









The Market Place of Political Opinions: Public Opinion Polling and its Publics in Transnational Perspective, 1930–1950 | 27
tested: not a single market research study in this period surveyed readers’ attention for 
published opinion polls.77 
Conclusion
The discussion about the appropriate conclusions to be drawn from the 1948 polling di-
saster was soon limited to the sphere of an expert public. The attention structures of this 
expert public, however, is a topic in its own right. In this sphere there were no obvious 
market-, opinion-, or attention-leader; rather, there existed – side-by-side, sometimes 
cooperating, sometimes in conflict – various communities of university-based empirical 
social researchers as well as commercial market and opinion researchers, a burgeoning 
field of behavioural scientists influencing communication research and political sciences, 
which resulted in controversial discussions about research designs: in short, a polyphony 
of experts’ voices which tried in different ways to attract attention to their particular 
method of surveying and measuring political opinion and opinion formation. Of course, 
in these often overlapping fields within the social sciences there were also market cycles 
which affected researchers’ attention, as evident in the publications in various expert 
journals within different disciplines and in various language areas which in turn directed 
the attention of other researchers and practitioners to particular issues. These market 
cycles were influenced by state and international organizations (especially UNESCO), 
but also private foundations (like Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie) as well as commercial 
organizations which acted as funding bodies, and thereby enabled particular research 
projects to be initiated, rolled out, or sustained.78 
Much recent research which can be subsumed under Lutz Raphael’s notion of the ‘scien-
tization of the social’ has shed light on the numerous processes through which applied 
social sciences have classified social phenomena, have defined social ‘problems’, and have 
provided advice for decisions-makers.79 And yet much more research is needed into the 
public ‘visibility’ of the social sciences within twentieth-century societies. How and in 
what media context did lay audiences encounter these scientific self-descriptions of so-
ciety, and to what extent did they accept or reject categories on offer? Indeed, how did 
communicative settings change the notion of scientists and experts? As Gangolf Hübinger 
recently commented, many social scientists intervening in public debate in the twentieth 
century found themselves labelled and transformed into ‘intellectuals’ within a mass me-







80	 Observation	made	 in	his	commentary	at	 the	section	‘Die	antidemokratische	Mentalität	 im	Blickfeld	der	kriti-
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publications, and the ‘scientific’ nature of their approach was increasingly questioned by 
university-based experts who decried both the lack of transparency and the absence of 
epistemological reflections. But within the context of democratic mass media societies, 
commercial public opinion polling attracted the most attention, and its products – pub-
lished opinion polls – arguably transformed conceptions as to what ‘public opinion’ was 
taken to mean in the second half of the twentieth century.81 A transnational history of 
the marketing and presentation of opinion polls is yet to be written, but it promises to 
be a fruitful area of research. 
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